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ANDRUS V. SIERRA CLUB: NO EFFECTIVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW IN THE FEDERAL 
BUDGET PROCESS 
Catherine Finnegan Shortsleeve* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
("NEP A")! to ensure that environmental factors would be given 
adequate consideration in the decision-making processes of federal 
agencies.1I To accomplish this purpose the Act requires that an en-
vironmental impact statement ("EIS")3 accompany "every recom-
mendation or report on proposals for legislation or other major 
Federal actions significantly affecting the environment."· In 1974 
the Sierra Club, along with other environmental groups, brought 
suit in a federal district court alleging that the annual budget re-
quests for the National Wildlife Refuge System ("NWRS"),IJ a pro-
gram in the Interior Department devoted to the conservation of 
fish and wildlife, are proposals for legislation and major federal ac-
• Editor-in-Chief, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW 
1 Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 102,83 Stat. 852 (1970) (current version in 42 U.S.C. §§ 4431-4374 
(1976». 
• See S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 SENATE 
REPORT], reprinted in [1973] LEGAL COMPILATION, U.S. EVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
420, 426-28 [hereinafter cited as 1973 LEGAL COMPo E.P.A.). 
• The Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") defines an environmental impact state-
ment to mean a "detailed written statement as required by Sec. 102(2)(C) of NEPA." 40 
C.F.R. § 1508.11 (1979). For purposes of textual variety, this article will not restrict itself to 
the phrase "environmental impact statement." The common terms "EIS" and "impact 
statement" will also be used with no difference in meaning intended. 
• 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). See note 12 infra. 
• See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 668dd and 668ee (West Supp. 1979). 
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tions significantly affecting the environment for purposes of NEP A 
and thus require an EIS.· Mter conflicting decisions had been 
reached in the district court and the court of appeals, the Supreme 
Court on June 11, 1979, held unanimously in Andrus v. Sierra 
Club7 (these three cases are at times generally referred to herein as 
"the Sierra Club litigation") that NEPA does not require federal 
agencies to prepare environmental impact statements to accom-
pany their annual appropriation requests. 
This article will explore the issues involved in extending NEPA's 
requirements into the federal budget process. Requiring an EIS to 
accompany the annual budget requests of all federal agencies 
which significantly affect the environment admittedly has far-
reaching implications for the administration of the federal budget. 
The federal budget, however, controls the funding of all federal 
agencies, and action on the budget is a most significant govern-
mental action in terms of effects on the environment.- NEPA's en-
vironmental review requirements accordingly should, in some man-
ner, be extended into the budget process and thereby into federal 
resource allocation decisions made at the highest levels so as to 
effectuate the purposes of the Act. 
The problem is basically one of balancing adverse interests: the 
governmental interest inefficiently producing an annual budget, 
and the national interest in protecting the environment against 
federal fiscal decisions which shortcut environmental concerns. 
The dimensions of the problem are best outlined by considering 
the overall purposes and goals of NEPA, the manner in which the 
federal budget process works, and the judicial responses to the 
problem demonstrated in the Sierra Club litigation. After doing so, 
it will be finally suggested that, despite the Supreme Court's hold-
ing to the contrary, NEPA's impact statement requirement can ap-
ply to the appropriation process with a minimal amount of admin-
istrative burden due to revised regulations simplifying EIS 
preparation. A method of so effectuating NEPA's policy through 
the federal budget process is by requiring impact statements to ac-
company authorization requests, the substantive legislative propos-
als which must, by law, precede requests for appropriations. The 
• Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187 (1975). 
• 442 U.S. 347 (1979). . 
• See generally H.R. RBP. No. 697, 9ad Cong., 2nd Seas. 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 
H.R .. RBP. No. 697), reprinted in [1974) U.S. CODB CONGo & AD. NBws 2778, 2778 [herein-
after cited as 1974 U.S. CODB). 
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authorization process specifically addresses the kind of governmen-
tal decision making which NEP A was intended to influence, and 
authorization impact statements would be effective and practical 
as a means of ensuring adequate consideration of environmental 
factors in federal budget decision making. 
II. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 
A. Purposes and Goals 
NEP A established a national policy requiring all federal agencies 
to give full consideration to environmental effects in planning and 
carrying out their programs.· Congress recognized that environ-
mental considerations had traditionally been ignored or omitted by 
government decisionmakers and that incorporating such considera-
tions into the everyday functioning of the federal government 
would be a difficult task.10 To accomplish this, NEP A requires that 
responsible officials of all federal agencies prepare an EIS detailing 
the impact of particular actions on the environment.l1 Such a 
statement is required when an agency proposes a major federal ac-
tion which will significantly affect the environment or submits a 
legislative proposal to Congress which may have the same effect. 11 
• The purposes of this Act are: To declare a national policy which will encourage produc-
tive and enjoyable harmony between man and the environment; to promote efforts which 
will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the 
health and welfare of man; [and) to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems 
and natural resources important to the Nation .... 
42 u.S.C. § 4321 (1976). I. See 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-5, 1973 LEGAL COMPo E.P.A., at 423-28. 
11 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). See note 12 infra; Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. 
Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971); 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra 
note 2, at 19, 1973 LEGAL COMPo E.P.A., at 446. 
,. Section 102(2)(C) sets out the following procedures: 
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible. . . (2) all agen-
cies of the Federal Government shall-
(c) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other 
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a 
detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be 
implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be in-
volved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
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The EIS itself serves three basic purposes: lS it requires agencies 
to analyze environmental factors in their decision making; it pro-
vides a record for judicial review if a court must later determine 
the adequacy of that environmental analysis; and it informs the 
public of the environmental costs of the proposed agency action. 1. 
The main thrust of the EIS requirement is to force federal agen-
cies to integrate the NEP A process into their own planning at the 
earliest possible time so that the policies of NEP A are meaning-
fully implemented. 111 Otherwise, the EIS becomes an empty exer-
cise in post hoc rationalization for decisions already made. Thus, 
the regulations18 prepared by the Council on Environmental Quali-
ty ("CEQ"), the body created by NEPA17 to assist the President in 
overseeing agency compliance with the Act,1s indicate that the pri-
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976) (emphasis added). 
11 CEQ regulations state that: 
[t)he primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to serve as an action-
forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in [NEPA) are infused into 
the on-going programs and actions of the Federal Government. . . . An environmental 
impact statement is more than a disclosure document. It shall be used by Federal offi-
cials in conjunction with other relevant material to plan actions and make decisions. 
40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1979) . 
.. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (1979). 
,. "For instance: 
(a) For projects directly undertaken by Federal agencies the environmental impact state-
ment shall be prepared at the feasibility analysis (go-no go) stage and may be supplemented 
at a later stage if necessary .... " 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5 (1979) . 
.. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1979). 
17 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1976). 
,. In 42 U.S.C. § 4344(3) (1976), CEQ is charged with the responsibility "to review and 
appraise the various programs and activities of the Federal Government in the light of the 
policy set forth in [the Act) ... and to make recommendations to the President with re-
spect thereto." 
Originally, CEQ was meant to serve as a presidential advisor in matters concerning 
NEP A. Some of its enumerated duties are: assisting the President in preparing an annual 
report on the environment, gathering and analyzing environmental information, reviewing 
and appraising governmental compliance with and furtherance of NEPA's objectives, recom-
mending to the President policies which will encourage improvement of the environment, 
and submitting an annual report to the President on the condition of the environment. Id. 
at § 4344. The Office of Management and Budget, however, which was originally intended to 
coordinate agency compliance with NEP A, has shown little enthusiasm for the Act and has 
been reluctant to assume an enforcement role with regard to it. See Hearing on S.1075, 
S.237 & S.1725 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st 
Sess. 116-17 (1969)(remarks of Sen. Jackson and Dr. Lynton Caldwell); 115 CONGo REc. 
19,012 (1969) (excerpt from Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Report on S.1075); F. 
Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, 
FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 238, 248-56 (1974). As a result, CEQ has gradually assumed 
its current position as the "undisputed overseer of agency compliance with NEPA." W. 
RoGERS, ENVIRONOMENTAL LAW 705 (1977). See generally Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. 
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mary purpose of an EIS is to serve as an "action-forcing" device to 
ensure that NEPA's policies and goals are infused into the every-
day workings of the federal government. 19 
As a result of the broad purposes to be accomplished, the scope 
and detail of an EIS may differ depending on its function and on 
the particular major federal action or legislative proposal under re-
view.IO A "programmatic" EIS is a type of statement involving a 
comprehensive analysis of agency programs which encompass a 
number of related actions with environmental effects.11 Past CEQ 
guidelines encouraged the use of such programmatic statements 
and indicated that "individual" statements on specific major ac-
tions were to be integrated with them. III An individual statement, 
Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
Because NEPA does not explicitly authorize CEQ to assume a key enforcement role in 
implementing the Act, Executive Order 11,514 supplies that authorization. Exec. Order No. 
11,514, § 3(h), 3 C.F.R. 271 (1974), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 note, at 1722-23 (1976). 
The Order directs CEQ to issue guidelines pertaining to the preparation of impact state-
ments. Although the guidelines lack the force of law, they have become influential interpre-
tive aids which courts have treated with substantial deference. W. ROGERS, supra at 708. 
See Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 417 U.S. 1301, 1309-10 (1974). In 1977, 
President Carter ordered CEQ to issue binding regulations. Exec. Order No. 11,991, § I, 3 
C.F.R. 124 (1977 Comp.). The new regulations were promulgated in final form on November 
29, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978-56,007 (1978), and became effective July 30, 1979. 
II CEQ regulations state that: 
U[Tlhe primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to serve as an action-
forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in NEP A are infused into the 
ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government .... An environmental im-
pact statement is more than a disclosure document. It shall be used in conjunction with 
other relevant material to plan actions and make decisions." 
40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1979). 
10 See Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 
422 U.S. 289, 322 (1975) (SCRAP II) (kind of environmental impact statement to be pre-
pared depends upon the federal action being taken). See also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
Ry. v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 610, 620-22 (D.D.C. 1974) (scope of statement determined by 
purpose of action). 
I, Examples include statements on the Upper Mississippi River Basin Study (Corps of 
Engineers), the Central Arizona Project (Bureau of Reclamation), and Minimum Property 
Standards (HUD). These are cited or disCUBBed in Anderson, supra note 18, at 335-38. See 
also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 367 F. Supp. 
128 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (contracts for stripmined coal); Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974) (the livestock grazing program); Scientists' 
InBt. for Pub. Information v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (the 
breeder reactor program). See generally W. ROGERS, supra note 18, at 785-87. 
II In many cases, broad program statements will be required in order to assess the envi-
ronmental effects of a number of individual actions on a given geographic area. . . . Sub-
sequent statements on major individual actions will be necessary where such actions 
have significant environmental impacts not adequately evaluated in tile program 
statement. 
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in other words, should be required only if later actions have a sig-
nificant impact not already adequately evaluated/as The advantage 
of a programmatic EIS is that it allows a broader look at alterna-
tives, permits a reevaluation of project objectives and future direc-
tions, and can usually be prepared at an earlier time in the life of a 
project before the project has built up such momentum as to make 
objective evaluation difficult. The risk of the programmatic state-
ment, however, is that it can obscure or be used to avoid producing 
individual statements for specific segments of the project as the 
project later unfolds.s• Both the court of appeals and the Supreme 
Court in the Sierra Club litigation considered the programmatic 
EIS as a possible way to approach the problem of applying NEP A 
to the complicated federal budget process. III 
B. The Council on Environmental Quality 
To carry out its overview responsibilities, CEQ during the period 
from 1970 to date has prepared three increasingly demanding sets 
of guidelines and a final set of regulations to serve both as guides 
to agencies preparing environmental impact statements and as in-
terpretive aids to courts in reviewing them.se The CEQ guidelines 
40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(d) (1979). For instance, the Department of Transportation should argu-
ably consider the long range impacts of building a nation-wide road system, one of which 
might be a progressive loss of productive farmland. Such an issue is appropriately consid-
ered in a program statement, rather than in the specialized impact statement for any given 
segment of highway. See Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 
849, 852 (8th Cir. 1973). 
II 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(d)(1) (1979) . 
.. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Administrator, 541 F. Supp. 1245, 1258 
(D.D.C. 1978) (preparation of a programmatic EIS does not obviate the necessity of prepar-
ing individual EIS's for specific segments). 
II In Sierra Club v. Andrus, the court of appeals held that when an agency undertook a 
programmatic review of a program with significant environmental effects and then re-
quested appropriations to fund its new course of action, an EIS must accompany that par-
ticular budget request. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 895, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1978). It held 
that when an agency expanded or revised a program significantly affecting the environment, 
a programmatic EIS should accompany the decision itself, and that a second EIS when the 
agencY requested funding would be redundant and unnecessary. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 
U.S. 347, 363 (1979). Both these positions assumed that agencies do prepare programmatic 
impact statements when they take a series of actions which will significantly affect the envi-
ronment. As a matter of practice, however, it could well be that agencies do not prepare 
such statements if they can avoid it, and the Supreme Court's' decision placed agencies on 
notice of their continuing obligation to prepare programmatic EIS's where such statements 
are appropriate. See text at notes 146-82 infra. 
n The first guidelines were issued in 1970. 35 Fed. Reg. 7,390 (1970). Those were revised 
in 1971,36 Fed. Reg. 7,724 (1971), and again in 1973, 38 Fed. Reg. 20,549, 20,550-51 (1973) 
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which were in effect until 1979 adhered consistently to the position 
that NEP A's impact statement requirement applied to agency ap-
propriation requests.1I7 However, in its final regulations which be-
came effective on July 30, 1979, CEQ reversed its position and spe-
cifically excluded appropriation requests from NEPA's coverage.18 
The Supreme Court's decision in the Sierra Club litigation to ex-
clude budget requests from NEP A's compliance requirements is 
based almost wholly on these 1979 CEQ regulations, thus reinforc-
ing CEQ in its position as the key enforcer of NEP A.III Because of 
CEQ's significant role in the Sierra Club litigation, an understand-
ing of that body's development during the past ten years is 
essential. 
On March 5, 1970, President Nixon directed CEQ to issue guide-
lines to assist federal agencies in implementing the EIS process.80 
On April 30, 1979, CEQ published interim guidelines which pro-
vided that major federal actions requiring impact statements in-
clude "recommendations or reports relating to legislation and ap-
propriations."81 On April 23, 1971, the guidelines were revised to 
state that major federal actions include "recommendations or 
favorable reports relating to legislation including that for appro-
priations."" On August 1, 1973, the guidelines were once again re-
vised, this time to the form noted by the court of appeals in the 
Sierra Club litigation.88 Major federal actions were now defined to 
include either "[r]ecommendations or favorable reports relating to 
legislation including requests for appropriations."" 
From 1970 to 1978, then, CEQ consistently indicated that im-
pact statement requirements applied to budget requests. During 
this eight year period the guidelines were simply advisory in na-
ture.811 Agencies did, however, promulgate regulations pursuant to 
(last version in 40 C.F.R. § 1500.5(a)(1) (1979». Final CEQ regulations were promulgated in 
1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978 (1978). 
17 See text and notes 30-34 infra. 
18 .. '[L]egislation' includes a bill or legislative proposal to Congress ... but does not 
include requests for appropriations." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.17 (1979) (emphasis added). 
I. See note 18 supra . 
.. Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. § 271 (1974), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 note, at 
1722-23 (1976) . 
• , COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, First Annual Report: Environmental Quality 
288 (1970) (emphasis added). 35 Fed. Reg. 7,390 (1970) . 
• 1 36 Fed. Reg. 7,724 (1971) (emphasis added). 
a. See Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 895, 900 (D.C. Cir. 1978) . 
.. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.5(a)(1) (1979) (emphasis added) . 
.. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1{a) (1979). See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 422 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1979). 
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the guidelines to govern their own NEPA compliance,86 and, based 
on the CEQ guidelines, two circuit court decisions had held that 
"proposals for legislation" included appropriation requests.37 
In 1977, President Carter ordered CEQ to issue binding regula-
tions which would establish uniform procedures for implementing 
the procedural provisions of NEP A. 8S The new regulations were is-
sued in final form on November 29, 1978,89 and became effective on 
July 30,1979,40 approximately one month after the Supreme Court 
rendered its decision in the Sierra Club litigation. These final reg-
ulations, while still requiring an EIS for legislative proposals, de-
fined "legislation" to include a bill or legislative proposal to Con-
gress, but not requests for appropriations.41 CEQ explained this 
reversal by stating that, in conjunction with the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget ("OMB"), it had concluded that the intricacies 
and time constraints inherent in the yearly budget cycle made im-
practical any meaningful preparation of impact statements within 
the budget preparation process.42 
The earlier CEQ guidelines, which included appropriation re-
quests within NEPA's scope,4S were in effect when the district 
court and the court of appeals rendered their decisions in the Si-
erra Club litigation.44 Both decisions supported and affirmed the 
guidelines, holding that appropriation requests fell within NEPA's 
.. The Department of the Interior indicated that actions requiring EIS's included "rec-
ommendations or favorable reports to Congress relating to legislation including appropria-
tions." 36 Fed. Reg. 19,343 (1971). The Department of Defense had a regulation which re-
quired that for "those budget items which are identified as having a significant effect on the 
environment, or which are controversial, an environmental impact statement shall be pre-
pared which will accompany the budget request." 32 C.F.R. § 214.6(d)(1)(ii) (1979) . 
.. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 468 F.2d 1164, 1181 
(6th Cir. 1972); Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 
481 F.2d 1079, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
a8 Exec. Order No. 11,991, § 1, 3 C.F.R. § 124 (1977 Comp.) . 
•• 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978-56,007 (1978) . 
•• 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978 (1978) . 
• , See note 28 supra. The Sierra Club suggested that there might have been collusion 
between OMB and CEQ with respect to CEQ's new wording of the regulations which ex-
cluded agency budget requests from NEP A compliance requirements. Brief for Respondents 
[Sierra Club] at 31-32 n.23, Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979). 
•• On the basis of "traditional concepts relating to appropriations and the budget cycle, 
considerations of timing and confidentiality, and other factors, ... the Council in its expe-
rience found that preparation of EIS's is ill suited to the budget preparation process." 43 
Fed. Reg. 55,989 (1978) . 
•• See 40 C.F.R. § 15oo.5(a)(1) (1979) . 
•• Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187 (1975), aff'd in part sub nom. Sierra Club v. 
Andrus, 581 F.2d 895 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
1980] ANDRUS V. SIERRA CLUB 213 
mandate and were subject to the EIS requirement.411 Between the 
time of the court of appeal's decision and the time of the Supreme 
Court's decision, however, the final regulations were proposed; and, 
as noted, one month after the Supreme Court's decision48 they 
went into effect.47 The Supreme Court's decision supported the re-
vised regulations and reversed the court of appeals, holding that 
NEP A's impact statement requirement does not extend to requests 
for appropriations in the federal budget process.48 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 
The most significant governmental decision making affecting the 
environment takes place in the course of agency, OMB and con-
gressional action on the federal budget, for this is the process 
through which federal programs are financed. At issue in the Si-
erra Club litigation was whether NEPA's policy of full disclosure, 
with its resulting environmental review requirements, should be 
extended into the budget process at an early stage and thereby 
into federal resource allocation decisions made at the highest levels 
of government. The problem involves complex and multi-dimen-
sional dynamics between OMB and Congress on two separate 
levels and suggests no readily definable solution. OMB and Con-
gress have traditionally experienced tension over which body 
would exert dominant control over the federal budget.48 Congress 
over the past decade has also struggled internally to control its 
own spending power and to coordinate related decisions as to how 
much will be spent and on what.lIo These struggles are exposed in 
the Sierra Club litigation. An appreciation of their complexity is 
essential to a reasoned analysis of the issues involved in introduc-
ing environmental review into governmental budget and spending 
processes. 
Of the several phases involved in the federal budget process, two 
are relevant in examining NEPA's compliance rquirements:1I1 the 
•• 395 F. Supp. at 1188; 581 F.2d at 895 . 
•• Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979) . 
.. The regulations became effective July 30, 1979. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978 (1978) . 
•• Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 347 (1979) . 
•• See generally L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 1-35 (1975); A. WILDAVSKI, 
THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (1974). 
00 See H. R. REP. No. 658, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 658), 
reprinted in (1974) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3462, 3467 [hereinafter cited as 1974 U.S. 
CODE). 
OJ See Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, U.S. Budget 
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President's annual formulation and transmittal of a proposed 
budget to Congress;12 and Congress' annual action to revise and 
approve the budget which then becomes the financial plan for the 
operation of federal agencies during the fiscal year.1S 
A. Executive Formulation and Transmittal 
The President submits his proposed budget to Congress in Janu-
ary of each year after many months of fiscal planning and coordi-
nation among all the federal agencies.14 Functioning as the Presi-
dent's budget coordinator, OMB stands at the center of the budget 
process-receiving, correlating, and revising agency budget esti-
mates before proposing them for presidential approval and subse-
quent transmittal to Congress.11 OMB's role is crucial, for by rea-
son of its extensive budgetary control, it has come to exert a 
decisive influence in determining which agencies and programs will 
prosper and which will not. IS The implications of subjecting 
OMB's budgetary decision-making processes to environmental re-
view are accordingly far reaching and require an understanding of 
OMB's role in the federal budget process as it has developed over 
the years. 
In the nineteenth century, budgeting had been a fragmented 
process in which agencies and bureau heads in the executive 
branch, and House and Senate committees in the legislative 
branch, all struggled for power over governmental funds in order to 
advance their own particular interests. I '7 In the early twentieth 
century, Congress, dissatisfied with this fragmentation and the re-
in Brief, 198065-68 [hereinafter the U.S. Budget in Brief]. 
•• "The President Rhall transmit to Congress during the first fifteen days of each regular 
session, the Budget .... " 31 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1976) . 
•• See 31 U.S.C. §§ 1321-32 (1976). 
.. See note 52 supra. 
•• There is in the Executive Office of the President an Office of Management and Budget 
. . . . The Office, under such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe, shall 
prepare the Budget, . . . and to this end shall have authority to assemble, correlate, 
revise, reduce, or increase the requests for appropriations of the several departments or 
establishments. 
31 U.S.C. § 16 (1976) . 
... The Office of Management and Budget stands at the center of Federal policy-making 
with life and death decisions about programs and procedures. The budget is the great 
judgment book for Federal Agencies and Activities, recording which shall live and which 
shall die, which shall prosper and which shall wane. 
H.R. REP. No. 697, supra note 8,1974 U.S. CODE at 2784. "Next to the President, the Direc-
tor [of OMB] is the most powerful person in the Executive Branch." [d. at 2783 . 
.. See generally L. FISHER, supra note 49, at 1-35. 
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suIting lack of control over expenditures, enacted the Budget and 
Accounting Act of 192V~8 Under the Act the President was to pre-
pare and transmit an annual budget to Congress pursuant to regu-
lations which he himself prescribed;1I9 and he was to be assisted in 
this task by the newly created Bureau of the Budget which was to 
be part of the Treasury Department, and which thereafter contin-
ued as part of the Treasury Department until 1939.80 Prior to 1921, 
individual agencies had submitted their budget requests directly to 
Congress, often to their favored legislative committees.8 } The Act 
changed this practice by directing that federal agencies submit 
their department budget requests to the Bureau of the Budget,82 
which then had the authority to revise, reduce, or increase those 
requests before recommending them to the President for transmit-
tal to Congress.83 
According to the policy of the Budget and Accounting Act, the 
presidential budget was intended to be a recommendation to Con-
gress. It would remain Congress' role to set expenditure policy." 
But while Congress established an entire bureau to assist the Pres-
ident with his budget responsibility, it made no similar attempt to 
reorganize its own procedures to accommodate the vast growth of 
governmental programs and federal spending.811 As a result, there 
developed an incongruity between executive and legislative re-
sources devoted to the formulation of the budget.88 The Bureau of 
the Budget's large and powerful staff afforded the President an ad-
18 Ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 . 
•• 31 U.S.C. § 16 (1976). See also H.R. REP. No. 658, supra note 50, 1974 U.S. CODE at 
3467. 
•• The Act created the Bureau of the Budget, located then in the Treasury Department, 
to assist the President in preparing the budget. Ch. 18, § 207, 42 Stat. 22 (1921). In Reor-
ganization Plan No.1 of 1939, 53 Stat. 1423, the Bureau of the Budget was transferred from 
the Treasury Department to the Executive Office of the President. In Reorganization Plan 
No.2 of 1970, reprinted in 31 U.S.C. § 16 note, at 1197 (1976) and in 84 Stat. 2085 (1971), 
the Bureau of the Budget was abolished and its budget-making functions were transferred 
directly to the President, who then delegated this responsibility to the newly established 
OMB. Exec. Order No. 11,541,35 Fed. Reg. 10,737 (1970), reprinted in 31 U.S.C. § 16 note, 
at 1200 (1976). See also L. FISHER, supra note 49, at 46-51. 
•• See H.R. REP. No. 658, supra note 50, 1974 U.S. CODE at 3467 . 
•• 31 U.S.C. §§ 15, 23 (1964) (current version at 31 U.S.C. §§ 15, 23 (1976». Congress does 
have authority to seek budget requests directly from an agency if Congress so pleases. 31 
U.S.C. § 15 (1976) . 
•• Id. at § 16 (1964) (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 16 (1976» . 
.. Id . 
.. See H.R. REP. No. 658, supra note 50, 1974 U.S. CODE at 3467 . 
.. Id. 
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vantage which Congress did not have,·'7 and the President, benefit-
ing from his superior resources, gradually took over much of the 
congressional role of program and financial policy making.88 
In 1970, President Nixon centralized budget power even more 
directly in the executive branch by transferring all budget func-
tions from the Bureau of the Budget to the President and then 
delegating these functions to the newly created OMB.·· OMB's di-
rector was to be appointed by the President and would, therefore, 
be accountable only to him.'7O Congress viewed with concern this 
centralization of power in the executive branch and the extensive 
power wielded by the director of OMB in the budget process, and 
in an attempt to curb the President's budget power and to make 
the director more accountable to Congress, Congress amended the 
Budget and Accounting Act in 1974'71 to require that OMB's direc-
tor and deputy director be appointed by the President, but by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate. '71 Despite this tradi-
tional struggle for power over the budget, however, Congress has 
continually chosen over the years to delegate to the President the 
responsibility for producing an annual recommended budget for 
Congress, and in doing so to be guided only by his own regula-
tions. '78 This is a significant fact to be recognized in considering the 
possibilities for environmental review in the executive-OMB 
budget formulation process, for a very probable effect of requiring 
environmental impact statements in that process would be to upset 
the carefully structured balance of budgetary power established by 
Congress and the President. '7' 
.OId. 
"Id. 
ee Id. See also Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970, reprinted in 31 U.S.C. § 16 note, at 
1197 (1976) and in 84 Stat. 2085 (1971); L. FISHER, supra note 49, at 46-58; note 60 supra. 
O. "The Office of Management and Budget and the Director shall perform such functions 
as the President may from time to time delegate or assign thereto." Reorg. Plan No.2 of 
1970, reprinted in 31 U.S.C. § 16 note, at 1197 (1976) and in 84 Stat. 2085 (1971). 
71 Act of March 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-250, § 1, 88 Stat. 11. 
01 31 U.S.C. § 16 (1976). 
01 See text at note 59 supra. 
o. The House Report accompanying the Budget and Accounting Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1407 (1976), touches upon this issue of budgetary power balance. 
The bill in no way impairs the President's statutory responsibility for the preparation 
and submission of the Budget to Congress, nor does it reduce the President's power to 
supervise and direct the Director in carrying out his functions ... (1) It helps'restore 
balance between Congress and the Executive in the budgetary process. Budget-making, 
a Presidental responsibility, is prescribed by law, not by any inherent right of office. The 
Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional and historic responsibility to appropriate 
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Timing is crucial in OMB's procedure for formulating the annual 
budget which the President submits to Congress each January. An 
example of the strict time schedule adhered to by OMB in produc-
ing this budget is the Interior Department's 1975 fiscal year budget 
request for NWRS7I which was involved in the Sierra Club 
litigation.'· 
The 1975 fiscal year budget request which was sent to Congress 
in January, 1974,77 was initiated in February, 1973, when OMB 
suggested a maximum appropriation level for the Department, and 
the Department'8 then allocated OMB's figure into suggested ap-
propriation levels for each agency and division within the Depart-
ment." In mid-May, 1973, each agency and program head reported 
to the Secretary of the Department how each intended to remain 
within the suggested appropriation levels,80 and until late August 
each had the continuing opportunity to seek budget revisions from 
the Secretary.81 In late September, 1973, the Department's draft 
statement was sent to OMB and, after review, OMB informed the 
Department in late November of the level of appropriation that 
OMB would recommend for presidential approval.81 The Depart-
ment then had a final opportunity to request revision of the 
budget allowance directly from the President before the President 
sent the budget request to Congress in January, 1974.88 The subse-
quent transmittal to Congress in January was accordingly the first 
funds for the neceuary tasks of government, receives the President's budget as a recom-
mendation, not as a fiat. . . . 
H.R. REP. No. 697, supra note 8, U.S. CODE at 2779 (emphasis in original). 
70 The National Wildlife Refuge System is administered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, a branch of the Department of the Interior. The refuge system was established by 
the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 
Stat. 927 (current version at 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 668dd and 668ee (West Supp. 1979». See note 
108 infra . 
•• Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd in part sub nom. Sierra 
Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 895 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd, Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 
(1979) . 
.. Fiscal year 1975 began July I, 1974, and ended June 30, 1975. 31 U.S.C. § 102O(a) 
(1976). Beginning with fiscal year 1977, Congress altered the fiscal year to begin on October 
1 and end on September 30. Id. The President's Budget is still submitted to Congress in 
early January of each year. 31 U.S.C. § 11 (1976) . 
.. Affidavit of Royston C. Hughes, Appendix to the briefs at A.125-26, Sierra Club v. 
Andrus, 581 F.2d 895 (D.C. Cir. 1978) . 
.. Id. at 126. 
10 Id. 
a. Id. at 127. 
n Id. at 128. 
II Id. 
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public announcement of budget requests for NWRS and all other 
federal programs.84 
Although confidentiality is not mentioned in the Act which 
created OMB,BI! OMB has developed and aggressively maintains a 
strong tradition of confidentiality in the budget process.8S Accord-
ing to agency practice, all budget estimates are privileged commu-
nications and remain privileged until the President's budget re-
quest is transmitted to Congress." Even then, the supplemental 
materials remain confidential unless formally requested by mem-
bers of Congress in connection with formal appropriation hear-
ings.88 It is accordingly apparent that requiring preparation of en-
vironmental impact statements during this process would seriously 
reduce OMB's flexibility. While the disclosure of the hidden envi-
ronmental costs of its budget decisions would expose OMB to 
outside pressure which could force it to consider environmental 
factors in making those decisions, it would also significantly bur-
den OMB administratively by interfering with OMB's streamlined 
and pressured process of producing the annual presidential budget. 
B. Congressional Action 
In January of each year, Congress begins its formal consideration 
of the President's recommended budget.8e Traditionally, however, 
there has been no unified congressional process comparable to 
OMB's concentrated and finely tuned procedure for producing the 
President's recommended budget. eo As previously noted, congres-
sional budgeting began as a fragmented process, marked by a 
.. See Budget Circular A-10, 11 3 (revised Jan. 18, 1964) . 
•• 31 U.S.C. § 16 (1976) . 
.. See Budget Circular No. 352, December 26, 1939; Budget Circular No. A-10, August I, 
1943 (formerly No. 352); Budget Circular No. A-10 (revised Jan. 18, 1964) (all emphasize the 
confidentiality of the budget process). 
17 "All budget estimates and supporting materials submitted to the Bureau of the Budget 
are privileged communications. Their confidential nature must be maintained, since they are 
the basic data and worksheets in the process by which the President resolves budget 
problems ...... Budget Circular No. A-10, 11 3 (revised Jan. 18, 1964). "The decisions of 
the President as to his budget recommendations and estimates are administratively confi-
dential until made public by the President." [d. at 11 4. 
.. "The Head of each agency is responsible for preventing disclosure of information con-
tained in such estimates and materials except on request in formal appropriation hearings 
and when requested by Members of the Congress in connection with their consideration of 
the budget after its transmittal." [d. at 11 3 . 
•• 31 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 658, supra note 50, 1974 U.S. CODE at 3463; 
U.S. BUDGET IN BRIEF, supra note 51, at 66. 
00 See text at notes 77-88 supra. 
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dispersion of responsibility among various House and Senate com-
mittees acting upon budgetary matters independently of one 
another.81 As the national budget experienced a sharp expansion in 
the 1930's and 1940's, an expansion which has continued to the 
present day, Congress gradually found itself unable to deal effec-
tively with its two budgetary functions of managing the economy 
and establishing public priorities in allocating federal resources"S 
In order to reestablish control over spending and spending policy, 
Congress, in addition to amending the Budget and Accounting Act, 
which was previously noted, enacted the Congressional Budget Act 
of 197488 which established a legislative budget process to harness, 
and thereby improve, congressional control over spending'" 
Fiscal year 1980 may be used as an example of the congressional 
budget process. Congress began its formal consideration of the 
President's budget in January, 1979. According to congressional 
practice established before the Congressional Budget Act and rein-
forced by it, Congress initially enacted legislation to authorize 
agency programs and overall funding levels before considering ap-
propriation requests for specific programs .. a Legislation setting 
•• See H.R. REP. No. 658, supra note 50, 1974 U.S. CODE at 3467-68. 
n [d. at 3468. 
The size of the budget is a leading indicator of the changes that have occurred [in 
American government]. During the first 100 years, Federal expenditures crossed the bil-
lion dollar mark only once-in 1865 when Civil War costs were at a peak. This level was 
not reached again until 1917 when the United States entered the World War. That 
War-like all others in which the United States has been involved-had a pronounced 
effect on the budget. Wartime spending zoomed to $18 billion, and although it dropped 
after the War, it never dipped below $3 billion. 
With the expansion of domestic and international commitments in the 1930& and 
1940&, the budget climbed at an uprecedented pace, and except for postwar dips, the 
escalation has continued uninterrupted for the past 25 years. Nowdays, the year-to-year 
spiral is a familiar part of the budget scene. Annual increases are in the $15-20 billion 
dollar range, more than was spent in the first century of American government. 
[d. at 3466. 
One indicator of the increasing loss of congressional control over spending was a fiscal 
year 1978 statistic recorded by OMB. In that year approximately 75 percent of the budget 
was beyond the effective control of Congress. See HOUSE COMMITI'EE ON THE BUDGET, CON-
GRESSIONAL CONTROL or EXPENDITURES 1 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as CONGRES-
SIONAL CONTROL or EXPENDITURES]. In .other words, even if Congress took no action 
whatever on that portion of the budget, the money would be spent anyway. See also H.R. 
REP. No. 658, supra note 50, 1974 U.S. CODE at 3469. 
.. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 928 . 
.. See H.R. REP. No. 658, supra note 50,1974 U.S. CODE at 3462. 
.. Clause 2 of Rule XXI of the House of Representatives provides that "no appropriation 
shall be reported in any general appropriation bill, or be in order as an amendment thereto 
for any expenditure not previously authorized by law .... " Paragraph 2 of Senate Rule 
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overall funding level~ for authorized programs is defined as author-
izing legislation, a process separate from and taking place prior to 
the actual appropriation of funds for the programs.ge Such authori-
zations fall into three categories depending upon their duration. 
Permanent authorizations remain in effect until Congress alters 
them;97 multi-year authorizations have terms of approximately two 
to five years;ge and annual authorizations expire each year and 
must be renewed annually for the program to continue.99 Depend-
XVI precludes "an appropriation bill containing amendments proposing new or general leg-
islation." CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL or Exl'BNDITURB8, supra note 48, at 19. See STANDING 
RULES OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, Rule 16(4); RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
Rule XXI(2); DESCHLER'S PROCEDURE IN THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 
26-1.2, § 25-3.1 (1977). 
M The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 directs that the Comptroller General of the 
United States, "in cooperation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget, and the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, shall de-
velop, establish, maintain and publish standard terminology, definitions, classifications and 
codes for Federal fiscal, budgetary and program-related data and information." 31 U.S.C. § 
1152(a)(l) (1976). In accordance with this statutory authority, the Comptroller General has 
published definitions distinguishing "authorizing legislation" from "appropriation". Author-
izing legislation is defined as:' 
Basic substantive legislation enacted by Congress which sets up or continues the legal 
operation of a Federal program or agency either indefinitely or for a specific period of 
time or sanctions a particular type of obligation or expenditure within a program. Such 
legislation is normally a prerequisite for subsequent appropriations or other kinds of 
budget authority to be contained in appropriation acts. It may limit the amount of 
budget authority to be provided subsequently or may authorize the appropriation of 
'such sums as may be necessary'. 
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TERMS USED IN THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 4 (1977). 
Appropriation is defined as: 
An authorization by an act of the Congress that permits Federal agencies to incur obliga-
tions and to make payments out of the Treasury for specified purposes. An appropriation 
usually follows enactment of authorizing legislation. 
Id.at 3 . 
.. Over one-half of the budget is permanently authorized. These permanent activities are 
regularly considered only by congressional appropriations committees. There is no periodic 
review by the substantive committees of Congress, as Congress has set up the program and 
authorized it to continue until further notice. Examples include Social Security, interest on 
the public debt, and the operations of most cabinet departments. CONGRESSIONAL CONTOL OF 
EXPENDITURES, supra note 92, at 19. 
M Multi-year programs must be renewed when their two- to five-year authorizations run 
out. Programs which require such reauthorization in a given year account for approximately 
10 percent of the federal budget. The multi-year programs scheduled for termination during 
1976 included revenue sharing, economic development assistance, water pollution control, 
higher education, and various health programs. Most, but not all, of the expiring programs 
were reauthorized. Id. at 21 (emphasis added). 
M Annual authorizations, which require an agency or program to go through both the 
legislative and appropriations committees each year account for approximately 15 percent of 
the budget. Examples are: education; health; nuclear energy; certain programs of the De-
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ing upon the duration of the authorizing legislation, then, funds 
may become available to a program annually after appropriations 
review only; funds may become available periodically as a multi-
year program comes up for re-authorization; or budget authority 
may become available each year only as authorized by Congress. 
Mter Congress had completed action on authorizations for the 
1980 fiscal year, a process which by statute is required to be com-
pleted by May 15,100 Congress considered specific agency budget 
requests.101 Congress had completed action on all such specific re-
quests by early September 101 and the measures were then trans-
mitted to the President for his approva1.103 On October 1 the fiscal 
year began.1M 
IV. THE SIERRA CLUB LITIGATION 
The central legal issue in the Sierra Club litigationlOIi was 
whether and under what circumstances NEP A requires a federal 
agency to prepare impact statements to accompany its annual 
budget requests for programs having significant environmental 
fense Department; and the State Department. The State Department is the only Cabinet 
department subject to annual authorization for its entire appropriation. [d. at 22; U.S. 
BUDGET IN BRIEF, supra note 51, at 66 . 
• 00 31 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976) . 
••• The appropriations and authorizations processes are happening concurrently through-
out this congressional ritual of completing action on the budget. Theoretically, authorizing 
legislation must be enacted before appropriations are approved. In practice, however, this is 
often not the case. If the authorizations process does not move efficiently enough to have the 
authorizing legislation in place at the time an appropriations committee is ready to approve 
funding, the appropriations committee will often approve funding without authorizing legis-
lation, knowing that authorization will come later. Telephone conversation with an Adminis-
trative Assistant, United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, November, 1979 . 
• 01 [d . 
• 01 UNITED STATES BUDGET IN BRIEF, supra note 51, at 67 . 
... 31 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976). Environmentalists in the Sierra Club litigation were seeking 
to have the EIS requirements of NEPA attach to the appropriation phase of this process. 
Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347-49 (1979). There is, however, an inconsistency involved 
in that approach. Effective environmental review in the budget process involves an analysis 
of the policies which underlie agency programs. The purpose of attaching an EIS to the 
budget process is to force Congress to question agencies as to why they are requesting 
money to fund actions which have an impact on the environment and whether there is an 
alternative to the proposed agency action which would less adversely affect the environ-
ment. According to congressional practice, this kind of inquiry into agency goals and policies 
occurs in the authorization process, rather than in the appropriation process. See text at 
notes 95-96 supra. Introducing an EIS into the appropriation process could arguably alter 
the roles which Congress has assigned to its various budget committees in its attempt to 
control congressional spending . 
••• 442 U.S. 347 (1979). 
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consequences.108 The action was commenced in the District Court 
for the District of Columbia107 in 1974 by members of the Sierra 
Club and two other conservation groups108 who were concerned by 
threatened cutbacks within NWRS.108 They contended that both 
the existing CEQ guidelinesllo and the spirit of NEPAlll required 
that budget requests for programs significantly affecting the envi-
ronment be considered to constitute "proposals for legislation and 
major Federal actions,"l11 characterizations that require an EIS 
under NEPA.ll8 The objective of the action was accordingly to ex-
tend NEPA's scope to the kinds of changes that occur within 
agency programs and have significant environmental effects but 
1 .. ld. at 348-49. 
107 Sierra Club v Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187 (D.D.C. 1975). The suit was brought against 
the Secretary of the Interior and the Director of OMB. The Sierra Club alleged that OMB 
had "significantly reduced the Interior Department's request for appropriations for the op-
eration of National Wildlife Refuge System during fiscal year 1974 and during other years 
without preparing or considering the environmental impact statement required by NEPA." 
Complaint at 11 25, Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187 (D.D.C. 1975). This i88ue was 
dropped in the subsequent litigation. The Sierra Club alleged, as well, that Section 
102(2)(C) of NEPA, supra note 12, required OMB to develop procedures to 888ure consider-
ation of environmental factors in the budget process. Complaint at 11 26, Sierra Club v. 
Morton, supra. 
108 The National Parks and Conservation Association and the Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. joined the Sierra Club in bringing the action. 
1.. NWRS is administered according to several statutes: Fish and Wildlife Coordination 
Act of 1934, 16 U.S.C. § 661-668jj (1976); Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, 16 U.S.C. § 742a-
754 (1976); Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 715-7158 (1976); Endangered Spe-
cies Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531-1545 (1976). 
The National Wildlife Refuge System, administered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice, consists of over 390 refuges containing more than 30 million acres in 49 states. See U.S. 
DEPT. OF INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL WILD-
LIFE REFUGE SYSTEM, November, 1-3 to 1-6 (1976) [hereinafter FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATE-
MENT]. The primary purposes of NWRS are to preserve endangered species and to sustain 
populations of migratory birds by maintaining, intact, an extended network of their natural 
habitats. A second purpose of NWRS is to provide for the System's educational and recrea-
tional use by the public. ld. 
no The guidelines in effect at the time of the district court case defined major federal 
actions to include "[r]ecommendations or favorable reports relating to legislation including 
requests for appropriations." 40 C.F.R. § 1500.5(a)(l) (1978); 38 Fed. Reg. 20,551 (1973). See 
text at note 34 supra. 
III "The thrust of § 102(2)(C) [see text at notes 11-12 supra] is that environmental con-
cerns be integrated into the very pr0ce88 of agency decision making." Andrus v. Sierra Club, 
442 U.S. 347-50 (1979). To support and advance this objective, CEQ regulations require 
federal agencies to "integrate the NEPA process with other planning at the earliest po88ible 
time to insure that planning and decisions reflect environmental values .... " 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1501.2 (1979). 
111 Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187, 1188 (D.D.C. 1975). 
111 See text at note 12 supra. 
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which never take shape as distinct major federal actions because 
they never come into focus outside the budget process.1l4 It was 
contended that decisions within a program such as NWRS relating 
to the operational, maintenance and staffing areas, among others, 
are often made in response to funding level increases and decreases 
made by OMB and the Interior Department, and although these 
decisions may significantly affect the environment by decreasing or 
terminating services which were previously available, NEP A could 
not reach them without reaching the budget process itself. To ac-
complish their objective, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that 
environmental review should be integrated into the budget process 
for NWRS through early preparation of an EIS by the agencies 
and departments involved. This would require the agencies and de-
partments to consider environmental factors and alternatives in 
making budgetary decisions on how to allocate or reallocate agency 
resources; would provide a record for judicial review of the ade-
quacy of consideration of such factors; and would inform the pub-
lic of the environmental costs of the proposed budget allocations. 
A. The District Court Decision 
The district court agreed with the contention that NEP A re-
quired federal agencies to prepare an EIS to accompany each an-
nual budget request for those programs which significantly affected 
the environment.ul It held that such requests were "proposals for 
legislation"u8 within the meaning of NEPA and were also "major 
Federal actions"ll7 which clearly had a significant effect on the en-
vironment.us The court accordingly ordered the Interior Depart-
ment to prepare statements for the annual budget requests of 
NWRS, U. and it also ordered OMB to take an active role in seeing 
that all federal agencies complied with NEPA in the budget 
process. 110 
Although annual budget requests had not before been at issue in 
,U4 The Sierra Club claimed that "[dJefendants have made major policy decisions and 
taken actions to cut back significantly the operations, maintenance, and staffing of units 
within the System." Complaint at '1117, Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187 (D.D.C. 
1975). 
UI Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187, 1188-89 (D.D.C. 1975). U. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). See note 12 supra. 
m [d. 
ue 395 F. Supp. at 1189. 
U. Order of May 6, 1975 at 'II I, Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187 (D.D.C. 1975). 
110 [d. at 2. 
-------
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a suit to enforce NEP A, the district court had substantial support 
for its decision. The CEQ guidelines at the time held that appro-
priation requests were proposals for legislation,121 and the Interior 
Department's own regulations followed those guidelines by provid-
ing that statements be prepared in connection with appropriation 
requests.122 The term "major Federal actions,"123 moreover, had 
been broadly interpreted to include as many actions as possible 
within NEP A's mandate,124 and there was a body of case law re-
quiring that an EIS accompany requests for appropriations to con-
struct or initiate specific projects.1211 The decision, however, left 
unanswered major questions peculiar to the practical problem of 
integrating NEPA within the budget process. Final budget deci-
sions are made in the executive branch in the short time period 
from September to December.128 It would be a difficult task for 
agencies to prepare meaningful statements and for OMB to con-
sider them carefully during this short period. The district court 
minimized this difficulty by suggesting that a budget EIS can and 
should be prepared early in the budget process rather than during 
the period from September to December when time pressure on 
111 40 C.F.R. § 1500.5(a)(1) (1979). See text at notes 30-37 supra . 
.. I 36 Fed. Reg. 19,343, 19,344 (1971) . 
... 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). See note 12 supra . 
.. < "[T)he statutory phrase 'actions significantly affecting the quality of the environment' 
is 'intentionally broad, reflecting the Act's attempt to promote an across-the-board adjust-
ment in federal agency decision making so as to make the quality of the environment a 
concern of every federal agency.''' Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 
F. Supp. 829, 833-34 (D.D.C. 1974), quoting Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. 
v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See generally Calvert Cliffs 
Coord. Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (D.C. Cir. 1971) . 
... In Environmental Defense Fund v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972) 
(Tellico Dam), the court held that "as long as appropriations are necessary for the con-
tinued construction of a project, impact statements should be filed." [d. at 1182. And in 
Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079 
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (development of the liquid metal fast breeder reactor), the court came to a 
similar conclusion: 
The program comes before Congress as a proposal for legislation each year, in the form 
of appropriations requests by the Commission. And as the Council on Environmental 
Quality has noted in its NEPA Guidelines, the statutory phrase "recommendation or 
report on proposals for legislation" includes "[r)ecommendations or favorable reports re-
lating to legislation including that for appropriations." 
[d. at 1088 (emphasis in original) (citing 36 Fed. Reg. 7,724 (1971)). Accord, Realty Income 
Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (congressional committees' approval of con-
struction of a federal building); Atchison, Topeka and Sante Fe Ry. v. Callaway, 431 F. 
Supp. 722 (D. D.C. 1977) (construction of dam and locks) . 
• 1. See text at notes 77-84 supra. See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187, 
1189-90 (D.D.C. 1975). 
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OMB and the agencies is the greatest.l27 Realistically, however, 
this is not practical for the reason that the kind of vital decision 
making at which NEPA is directed occurs late in the budget 
process. . 
There are, in fact, two possibilities for the timing of an EIS in 
the budget process as previously outlined. us The first would be for 
the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS"), the agency within the De-
partment which administers NWRS, to prepare an EIS to accom-
pany its preliminary budget request to the Department in mid-
May. The Department, however, could well ask FWS to revise this 
request to bring it in line with OMB's appropriation levels for the 
particular fiscal year, and such a preliminary request would argu-
ably be predecisional and not yet a definite "proposal for legisla-
tion" requiring NEPA compliance. The second possibility would be 
for the Department to prepare an EIS when it submits its draft 
budget request to OMB in late September. By virtue of the state-
ment, OMB would have an opportunity to consider environmental 
factors in finalizing the Department's budget for recommendation 
to the President, and at this point the Department's request would 
be considered a proposal which would involve no further signifi-
cant changes in the NWRS budget allocation.118 
Late September, then, would seem to be the appropriate time 
for an EIS within the budget process. But the period from late 
September through December is the most pressured time in the 
budget cycle for both OMB and the agencies. An issue further 
complicating the problem is that a large number of statements 
would probably have to be prepared by many federal agencies, 
tending to overwhelm OMB and render it less able to carry out its 
budgetary responsibilities. The district court recognized and dis-
missed this issue by noting that NEPA required impact statements 
to be prepared only on those legislative proposals significantly af-
fecting the environment. lao As the court itself declared elsewhere 
in its opinion, however, the term "major Federal actions" has been 
broadly interpreted,lal and an EIS would conceivably have to ac-
company every budget request of any agency whose activities 
'17 Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187, 1189-90 (D.D.C. 1975). 
,.. See text at notes 77-84 supra. 
'" Affidavit of Curtis Bohlen at 11 3, Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187 (D.D.C. 
1975). 
'18 Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187, 1190 (D.D.C. 1975). 
'8' See note 124 supra. 
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might have a significant environmental impact.l8111 
There was another issue which arguably was the most significant 
and troublesome one raised by the litigation and which the district 
court did not expressly recognize: balance of power between Con-
gress and OMB as to the budget, with each body trying to exert 
dominant budgetary control.188 Statements attached to each an-
nual budget request, or to any budget request, would expose much 
of the negotiation which occurs behind closed doors at OMB and 
could, therefore, weaken OMB's substantial control over the 
budget. 1 .. If the balance of power between these two branches of 
government were to be upset, it might well be that Congress, 
rather than the courts, should effect the change. 
B. The Court of Appeals Decision 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the 
district court in part. It interpreted NEPA's "proposal for legisla-
tion" provision to include only non-routine budget requests and 
held that statements were not required for the annual budget re-
quests of all ongoing federal programs but only for those which 
envisioned a significant change affecting the environment.1811 In 
fashioning this remedy, the court of appeals noted with concern 
that preparation of a potentially large number of annual state-
ments would "trivialize NEPA"l88 by fostering shallow and hurried 
preparation and consideration of impact statements.18? An EIS 
should accordingly accompany an agency's budget request only in 
those instances when the request sought to initiate a new course of 
action which had been preceded by a comprehensive review or 
evaluation constituting a major federal action within the agency.l88 
10 This would include, for eumple, budget requests from the ICC, see Aberdeen &: Rock-
fish R.R. Co. v. SCRAP [SCRAP II], 422 U.S. 289, 320-21, 322-27 (1975), and the SEC, 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 697-700 (D.D.C. 1974). 
118 See text at notes 57-74 supra. 
1M See text at notes 43-46 supra; H.R. REP. No. 697, supra note 8,1973 U.S. CODE 2783-
84. 
1 •• Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 895, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
1 .. [d. at 904. 
II, [d. 
1~ "In our view, section 102(2)(C) contemplates a 'proposal' for taking new action which 
significantly changes the status quo, not for a routine request for budget approval and ap-
propriations for continuance and management of an ongoing program." [d. at 903. The court 
suggests that a significant change in the status quo may give rise to a programmatic review 
within the agency. This programmatic review would involve a comprehensive reconsidera-
tion or reevaluation of agency goals and policies with respect to the particular 'change'. 
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The Interior Department had, in response to the district court ac-
tion, voluntarily undertaken and completed such a programmatic 
review and had issued an EIS for NWRS188 which included an 
analysis of the environmental effects of proposed and alternative 
funding levels for the System.140 In view of this, the court of ap-
peals concluded that the Department had met its current NEPA 
obligations. 141 
The court of appeals affirmed that part of the district court's 
decision requiring OMB to become actively involved in the en-
forcement of NEPA.141 In doing so, it implicitly recognized as sig-
nificant the tension between Congress and OMB as to which would 
exert dominant control over the budget.l48 The court was also sen-
sitive to OMB's position with regard to confidentiality in the 
budget process, suggesting that OMB integrate into its budget pro-
cess impact statements submitted by agencies in such a way as to 
permit environmental analysis without betraying genuine budget-
ary confidences;144 but the court offered no suggestion as to how 
this could effectively be done. 
The decision of the court of appeals was based on reasonableness 
rather than upon statutory provisions, legislative history, or case 
law; but it offered no guidelines for courts to use in determining 
when an agency's budget request involved changes which were sig-
nificant enough to require an EIS. In addition, it left unanswered 
the question whether an agency ever has a judicially enforceable 
According to the court's decision, when such a programmatic review occurs within an 
agency, a programmatic EIS should accompany the agency's next budget request which, 
presumably, will seek to fund the changed circumstances . 
• 0 The draft environmental statement was issued in November, 1975. 40 Fed. Reg. 
54,451, 55,376, 55,378 (1975). The final EIS, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, supra note 
108, at Table 26 (see following page), was issued in November, 1976. 41 Fed. Reg. 53,129 
(1976) . 
••• FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, supra note 108, at Table 26 (see following page). 
10. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 895, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1978) . 
••• [d. at 904 . 
• 41 [d. at 903-06. 
••• The matter may be capable of resolution in a manner that presents program proposals 
in terms that permit an environmental analysis, without disclosure of dollar projections 
or other betrayal of genuine budget confidence .... [S)ince proposals for major program 
reviews and changes can probably be disclosed in general outline, sufficient for impact 
statement purposes, without undercutting the objective underlying budget-type secrecy, 
OMB can fairly be called on to develop a proposal that serves and harmonizes both 
NEPA and the budget processes. 
[d. at 905-06. 
MIGRATORY BIR!:6 
Year DollarsY M. Y. Const. 4/ 
1974 13.6 (0 491 2.2 
1975 13.9 1.1 469 0.5 0 
1976 14.1 1.5 469 0.7 0 
1977 14.1 1.5 469 0.7 
H 
Table 26 
FUNDING AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION FOR THE NATIONAL 
WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM UNDER CURRENT LEVEL 
PRXiRlIM = ($ MlLLICNS) 1/ AND MANPaiER (PIT) 2/ 







48 0 0 
46 0 0 
46 0 0 






M.Y. eoost. Dollars M.Y. canst. 
75 0 3.5 269 0 o 
71 0 o 3.8 0 257 
77 0 o 4.0 257 0 o 
77 0 o 4.0 0 257 0 o 
Dollars M.Y. canst. 
20.1 0 883 2.2 0 
21.0 1.2 843 0.5 0 
21.3 1.6 843 0.7 0 
21.3 1.6 843 0.7 0 
I 1978 14.1 1. 5 469 0.7 0 2.2 0.1 46 0 0 1.0 0 77 0 4.0 0 257 o 21.3 1.6 843 0.7 
'" C) =19~79~ ___ 1~4~.1~1~.~5~~4~6~9 __ ~0~.~7~0~ __ ~2~.~2 __ ~0~.1~ __ 4~6~~0~~ ____ ~1~.~0 __ ~0 ____ 7~7~~0~~0~ ____ ~4~.~0 __ ~0 __ ~2~5~7 __ ~ __ ~ ____ ~2~1~.~3~~1~.~6 __ ~8~4~3 __ ~0~.7~0~ 
1980 14.1 1.5 469 0.7 0 2.2 0.1 46 0 0 1.0 0 77 0 o 4.0 257 0 o 21.3 1.6 843 0.7 
1981 14.1 1.5 469 0.7 0 2.2 0.1 46 0 0 1.0 77 0 o 4.0 257 0 o 21.3 1.6 843 0.7 
1982 14.1 1.5 469 0.7 0 2.2 0.1 46 o 1.0 77 0 4.0 0 257 0 21.3 1.6 843 0.7 0 
1983 14.1 1.5 469 0.7 2.2 0.1 46 o 1.0 77 0 o 4.0 257 21.3 1.6 843 0.7 
1984 14.1 1. 5 469 0.7 0 2.2 0.1 46 0 0 1.0 77 0 4.0 257 o 21.3 1.6 843 0.7 
~~~8~~~~1~4~.~1~1~.~5 __ ~4~6~9 __ 0~.7~~ __ -=2~.~2 __ ~0~.1~~4~6~~~~ __ ~1.0 77 4.0 0 257 0 o 21.3 1.6 843 0.7 
= 168.516.1 9.7 26.6 1.1 o 0 11.7 0 o 47.3 0 o 254.1 17.2 9.70 
11 '!he projected coot to inp1eorent ref\Xje prograrrs is based on 1974 dollars and does not inclu:le expansion for inflationary tre:>ds or rroney!manp<:>.ler 
to operate new areas aoguired after July I, 1974. 
Y Manpower figures inc1u:le ooly the man-years of perrranent full tirre personnel, not teJTporary or other appointments, associated with the Resource Manage-
nent Appr~riatiCll. 'Ihese figures are not related to personnel ceilings. 
Y Resource Managarent Apprcpriation: oontains operating and maintenance/rehabilitation and restoration rronies. Approximately 80% of the Cperationa1 
fJlaintenance rrcnies are ~t 00 salaries with the remainder for eqW.IIfEmt and supplies. Jehabilitatidn and restoration of facilities are accarplished 
by a revolving fund within the Jesource Managerrent Apprcpriatioo in the $2,500 to $60,000 range (knOdfl as "minor rehab"). 
y Construction projects rehabilitation projects """r $60,000 (known as "major rehab") are oontained within the Construction and Anadrcrrous Fish 
lIR>rcpriatioos . 
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duty to undertake a general review of an entire program extending 
beyond any particular significant changes in that program. In 
C. The Supreme Court Decision 
In an opinion written by Mr. Justice Brennan, the Supreme 
Court unanimously held that budget requests were neither "pro-
posals for legislation" nor "major Federal actions" for purposes of 
NEPA.I.. Environmental impact statements, therefore, were not 
required in connection with any agency budget requests to OMB or 
to Congress. 
1. Budget Requests as "Proposals for Legislation" 
In holding that budget requests do not constitute proposals for 
legislation, the Court adopted the district court's all-or-nothing ap-
proachl•7 and held that no budget request is a proposal for legisla-
tion."8 The Court rejected as unsupported by the explicit language 
of NEPA the distinction drawn by the court of appeals between 
routine and non-routine budget requests ... • The court of appeals 
had focused on budgetary control and the administrative implica-
tions of impact statements for OMB.lllo The Supreme Court, how-
... We have no occasion at this time to consider whether, or in what instances, a "new 
look" may be required because of vastly changed circumstances, either by NEPA or per-
haps by some other provision of federal law. Nor need we now consider whether a court 
may mandate any such duty to take a new look. 
Id. at 904. 
An indirect issue raised by the question whether a court may mandate a duty to under-
take a progr8Dlm8tic review is that courts have been reluctant to enforce NEPA's legislative 
proposal provision. See Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 
Wingfield v. Office of Management and Budget, 10 E.R.C. 1961 (D.D.C. 1977); Note, 
NEPA's Forgotten Clause: Impact Statements for Legislative Proposals, 58 B.U. L. REv. 
560 (1978); Impact Statements on Legislative Proposals: Enforcing the Neglected Half of 
NEPA's Mandate, 7 ENvT'L L. REP. (ELI) 10,145 (1977). Cf. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe 
R.R. Co. v. Callaway, 431 F.Supp. 722 (D.D.C. 1977). Courts traditionally have been reluc-
tant, under various concepts of "justiciability", to interfere with the legislative process by 
enjoining agencies from submitting recommendations to Congress on proposed legislation. 
See Chamber of Commerce v. Department of the Interior, 439 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1977); 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962) (political question concept of justiciability); 
Wright, Miller & Cooper, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3529-3535 (justiciability 
concepts). 
1 •• Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 360, 364-65 (1979) . 
... "Either all appropriation requests constitute 'proposals for legislation' or none does." 
Id. at 356. 
141 Id. at 361. 
1 •• Id. at 356. 
1 .. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 895, 904-06 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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ever, focused upon the implications of impact statements for Con-
gress.1II1 In holding that NEP A does not apply to appropriation 
requests, the Court implicitly recognized the continuing struggle 
within Congress to control its own spending l&2 and supported this 
effort by confirming the congressionally established distinction be-
tween appropriations and authorizations. lIi3 
Authorizing legislation, as has been noted, is basic substantive 
legislation which must be enacted before appropriations are ap-
proved for an agency program. 1M It is the function of authorizing 
legislation to examine agency goals and policies and establish a 
fiscal policy for the particular agency or program pursuant to Con-
gress' role as fiscal policy maker.1II11 After an agency has received 
the required authorization, that agency's appropriation requests 
are then considered and approved. lIS The Supreme Court noted 
that impact statements attached to such appropriation requests 
would "flood" the House and Senate appropriations committees 
with statements focused on policy issues, when such policy issues 
should have been dealt with in the preceding authorization pro-
cess.1II7 The Court emphasized that the appropriations committees 
were limited to providing funds for authorized programs and that 
the distinction between authorizations and appropriations was 
maintained to ensure that policy matters and financial matters 
were considered independently of one another. The Court further 
noted that this division of responsibility was intended to enable 
the appropriations committees to concentrate on financial matters 
and to prevent them from trespassing on substantive legislation. llls 
The Court accordingly held that appropriation requests did not 
constitute "legislation" for purposes of NEP A. 
In support of its decision the Court relied primarily on legisla-
tive history and congressional practice which distinguished "legis-
lation" from "appropriation"11l8 and on the newly revised and 
U1 442 u.s. at 358-61. 
"" See text at notes 89-92 supra . 
.. I 442 U.S. at 359-60. 
, .. See text at note 96 supra . 
... See CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF EXPENDITURES, supra note 92, at 19. See also, H.R. 
REP. No. 658, supra note 50, 1974 U.S. CODE at 3467. 
,.. See text at notes 95-99 supra . 
.. 7 442 U.S. at 364. 
, .. [d. at 361. 
... [d. at 359. 
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mandatory CEQ regulationsl60 which excluded budget requests 
from the definition of legislation, thus preserving this traditional 
distinction between legislation and appropriation. 181 In further 
support of CEQ's position the Court set forth statutes,181 executive 
office circulars,18a and rules of both houses of Congress,l84 all of 
which emphasized the continuing viability of the distinction. 111 
The Court accordingly concluded that since appropriation requests 
had the limited purpose of providing funds for authorized pro-
grams, they did not constitute legislation for purposes of NEP A.l88 
2. Budget Requests as "Major Federal Actions" 
The Court rejected the suggested alternative interpretation of an 
appropriation request as constituting "major Federal actions" for 
the same reason that such requests were not "proposals for legis-
lation." Appropriations were not actions but merely funded ac-
tions,187 and NEPA applied only to the proposed programmatic ac-
tions themselves.l88 Thus, if an agency were to expand or revise a 
program so as to constitute a major federal action significantly af-
fecting the environment, an EIS would be required to accompany 
the underlying programmatic decision.18• By the same token, if an 
agency were to request appropriations to initiate a major new pro-
gram that would significantly affect the environment, or were to 
fail to request funding so as to terminate a program, an EIS would 
'OG CEQ issued regulationa to become effective July 30, 1979. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978-56,007 
(1978). See note 28 supra. 
"' Id. 
'h 31 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1407 (1976). See note 96 supra; 442 U.S. at 359 n.18. 
II. Budget Circular No. A-19 (1972) establishes OMB's procedures for "legislative coordi-
nation and clearance," while OMB (Circular No. A-ll revised 1978) defines OMB guidelines 
for the "preparation and submission of budget estinlates." See 442 U.S. at 359-60 n.18. 
OMB Circular A-19 has since been revised to exclude appropriations requests from the defi-
nition of legislation. OMB Circular No. A-19, 11 3 (Sept. 20, 1979). 
, .. 442 U.S. at 360-61. See note 95 supra. 
'h The distinction is maintained "to aaaure that program and financial matters are con-
sidered independently of one anotl1er. This division of labor is intended to enable the Ap-
propriationa Committees to concentrate on financial iBBues and to prevent them from tres-
paaaing on substantive legislation." CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL I)F EXPENDITURES, supra note 
92, at 19. 
, .. 442 U.S. at 361. 
'H Id. at 362. 
, .. Id. at 363. 
, .. Id. at 363 n.22. The Court emphasized that major federal actions include both the 
"expansion and revision of ongoing programs." Id. at 363 n.21, quoting 1969 SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 20, LEGAL COMP., E.P.A. at 446. 
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be required for the proposed underlying programmatic decision.I70 
For the Court, the EIS issue was not "whether" but "when"; and 
to avoid redundancy, it directed that agencies prepare their state-
ments prior to and apart from the appropriation process. 
The Supreme Court's opinion establishes that OMB's power to 
make life and death decisions for federal programsl7l through the 
budget process remains beyond the reach of NEPA. Just what 
NEP A does require of federal agencies under the Court's decision 
is, however, elusive at best. The unresolved issues fall roughly into 
the following four categories. 
The Court decided by assumption, rather than by logic or rea-
soning, that an EIS would be recognized as required when agencies 
expand or cut back programs with environmental consequences.172 
This assumption, however, mayor may not be correct as a matter 
of agency practice. Human nature coupled with administrative 
considerations suggests that agencies will avoid preparing impact 
statements where there is a good-faith question as to whether or 
not one is required. us 
Secondly, the Court held that an EIS is required to be prepared 
on underlying programmatic decisions which constitute major fed-
eral actions and on proposals to expand or revise agency programs 
significantly affecting the environment.174 Thus, if an agency re-
quests a higher level of funding to accommodate an expanded pro-
gram which had been preceded by a comprehensive review and 
evaluation within the agency, the EIS requirement would attach to 
the underlying decision to expand, and not to the subsequent 
budget request. If an agency's revision or cutback is involunta-
rily imposed by OMB's fiscal decisions, the EIS requirement would 
attach when the agency revised its programs in response to the 
OMB budget cuts.I711 It may be difficult to establish, however, that 
17. 442 u.s. at 363 n.22. 
171 See H.R. REP. No. 697, supra note 8, 1974 U.S. CODE at 2748; see text at note 56 
supra. 
17. 442 U.S. at 361-62. See note 25 supra. 
17. See Anderson, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Ac:r, supra note 18, at 244-45. 
17. 442 U.S. at 363. 
17. There is some difficulty in determing when, in these circumstances, FWS will be re-
quired by the Court's decision to prepare an EIS. From late September through December 
when OMB had made its final decisions as to what level of funding it would recommend for 
FWS, see notes 77-83 supra, FWS knew without the benefit of an EIS the level of appropri-
ation it could expect for the next fiscal year. FWS's presidentially recommended budget 
would then have been considered by CongreBB, also without the benefit of an EIS. After 
CongreBB had approved a level of appropriation for FWS, see text at notes 89-104 supra, 
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either of these decisions has been made by an agency. In their 
complaint in the district court, for instance, the plaintiffs had al-
leged that the Interior Department had made major policy deci-
sions and taken action to cut back significantly on FWS pro-
grams.178 The Department had denied this allegation, and the issue 
was dropped in the subsequent course of the litigation. It would 
have been a difficult question of fact, however, as to whether the 
Department had or had not reduced the FWS budget significantly, 
and this information is difficult to obtain in light of the traditional 
confidentiality of the budget process.177 
Thirdly, how is it to be determined whether or not a specific ex-
pansion or revision requires an EIS? The Court states that not 
every expansion or revision will occur as part of a programmatic 
decision constituting a major federal action,178 but it offers no 
standard for determining which do and which do not. Nor does the 
Court indicate whether the agency or the courts shall make such a 
determination. 
Finally, under what circumstances is an agency under an en-
forceable obligation to prepare an EIS when it makes a decision to 
expand or cut back on a program? Courts are inherently reluctant 
to interfere with the free flow of information between the executive 
and legislative branches of the government,17. and a court may well 
be unwilling to enjoin the Interior Department's budget request 
from going to Congress because the Department or OMB had re-
duced FWS's budget and had failed to prepare an EIS on the un-
derlying programmatic decision. 
In sum, it is doubtful that requiring FWS to prepare an EIS 
when it revises its programs in response to OMB's cutbacks effec-
tively implements NEPA's objective of infusing environmental 
concerns into vital policy decisions affecting the environment. The 
vital policy decision in these circumstances is OMB's decision to 
FWS would have been in one of three positions: it would have been forced to revise its 
programs in response to reduced levela of appropriations; it would have been able to main-
tain its ongoing programs in response to roughly constant or unchanged levela of funding; 
or, it would have been able to expand its programs in response to increased levela of appro-
priations. In the first and last of these situations, FWS, according to the Court's decision, 
would be required to prepare an EIS in reallocating agency funds to reduce or to expand 
programs. See text at note 174 supra, 176-78 infra . 
• .,. Complaint at 1117, Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187 (D.D.C. 1975) . 
• 77 See text at notes 85-88 supra . 
.. I 442 U.S. at 362-63 . 
... See note 145 supra. 
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reduce the budget request of the Interior Department/lo and this 
decision remains beyond the reach of NEP A under the Supreme 
Court's opinion. Requiring FWS to prepare such an impact state-
ment in response to OMB's cutbacks would involve environmental 
considerations only in less significant policy decisions connected 
with FWS's subsequent reallocation of its reduced agency 
resources. 
The Court's decision, however, does strengthen NEP A in one re-
spect. The Court assumes throughout its opinion that an EIS is 
indeed required when an agency takes action to expand or cut back 
on existing programs significantly affecting the environment. III 
The only issue addressed by the Court is the timing of the prepa-
ration of the statement in the evolution of a project. From this 
perspective, the Court supports the use of section 102(2)(C) of 
NEPA III to protect the environment against those who would 
harm it through lack of foresight or interest or through active 
disregard. 
V. NEPA AND THE BUDGET PROCESS 
The budget process controls the funding of all agencies and pro-
grams, and it should in some manner be required to comply with 
NEPA if the goal of infusing environmental review into govern-
mental decision making is to maintain vitality. Excluding NEPA 
from this process undermines the Act and weakens it as a viable 
tool for implementing environmental review. The question, then, is 
how to apply NEPA effectively. The Supreme Court held that this 
application could not be done within the appropriation process. In 
balancing the government's interest in budgetary efficiency, which 
substantially eliminates individual interests from budgetary re-
view, against the environmental benefit of exposing the process to 
NEPA and thereby impeding that efficiency, the Court found in 
favor of the government. There remains, however, the possibility of 
applying NEP A to the authorization process.118 
The following sections of this article suggest that Congress or 
CEQ can and should incorporate NEPA's environmental review re-
quirements into the federal budget process through both the ap-
I.. See text at notel 77-84 supra. 
,., 442 U.S. at 363 n.22. 
, •• 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). See note 12 supra. 
,., See text and notes at notes 96-99 supra. 
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propriation process and the authorization process. The Supreme 
Court decision excludes the appropriation process from NEPA's 
present scope. Congress and CEQ, therefore, should address the is-
sue aggressively through both amendatory legislation and regula-
tion since it involves sophisticated governmental machinery with 
which both have particular expertise. 
A. The Appropriation Process 
The appropriation process is an annual opportunity for Congress 
to review federal agencies and programs.184 Each year the House 
appropriations subcommittees examine extensively the financial 
practices and needs of all the agencies,18G and in considering indi-
vidual budget requests, the subcommittees hold hearings.188 Each 
agency appears before its specified subcommittee with "justifica-
tion books"187 which detail its programs, its past and present ex-
penditures, and its budget requests for the next year. The subcom-
mittee then questions the agency on any subject connected with 
appropriation requests or related matters ranging from trips by in-
dividual agency employees to long range program policies and 
goalS.188 Consequently, the appropriation process is an effective 
form of congressional control over agencies and would serve 
NEPA's purpose of infusing environmental review into important 
government decision making. It is arguably for this purpose and 
reason that CEQ originally and through 1979 defined NEPA to in-
clude appropriation requests.189 
The revised CEQ regulations make it more practical to accom-
modate impact statements to the budget process, for the revised 
regulations attempt to streamline the EIS process by reducing 
paperwork and delays.190 Furthermore, the regulations offer an im-
proved process for preparing such statements for legislative pro-
posals,191 which could be redefined through amendatory legislation 
184 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF EXPENDITURES, supra note 92, at 31. 
1" In 1977, "these subcommittees conducted hundreds of hearings, heard 4,276 witnesses, 
and accumulated 64,762 pages of printed hearings. The Senate hearings tend to be leBB de-
tailed and extensive, and they often concentrate on appeals by Federal agencies for the 




180 See text at notes 26, 27 supra. 
1" See 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978 (1978). 
101 See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.8 (1979). 
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to include budget requests. The legislative EIS would be consid-
ered as part of the formal transmittal of the legislative proposal to 
Congress, but it could arrive up to thirty days late as long as it was 
available for the relevant hearings and deliberations. leI Permitting 
the agency to produce its completed budget EIS thirty days after 
the President transmitted his budget to Congress would release 
some of the pressure attributable to the tight timing schedule of 
the budget cycle. It would not, moreover, detract from the spirit of 
NEPA as long as the agency had previously incorporated environ-
mental review into its own budget decisions, despite delayed sub-
mission of the statement. 
The revised regulations further provide that, in most instances, 
only a draft EIS need be prepared. lea This eliminates the necessity 
of both a draft and final EIS, such as is required for major federal 
actiOlls,IH and would further reduce paperwork for agencies pre-
paring such budget statements. Finally, the revised regulations 
make provisions for the non-publication of confidential data. lei 
Were it to be determined that there was a clear and unavoidable 
conflict between the requirements of NEPA and the requirements 
of the Budget and Accounting ActiN as to confidentality within the 
budget process, those provisions of NEP A mandating publication 
of statements would be ineffective.le7 Those communications be-
tween OMB and the agencies which qualify as confidential could 
remain so under the new regulations,198 while the remaining deci-
sion-making activities could fully comply with NEPA. This would 
provide Congress with an EIS detailing the environmental costs of 
agency budget decisions while Congress is reviewing and acting 
upon individual agency budget requests without destroying the 
confidentiality OMB requires to function effectively. It should also 
be emphasized that once an agency has developed its first budget 
EIS, that particular EIS could serve as a model for each subse-
quent statement. In some cases the initial EIS would simply need 
'" Id. § 1506.8(a). 
, •• Id. § 1506.8(b)(1), (2). 
, .. Id. § 1502.9. 
, .. Id. § 1507.3(c). 
'M Ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (1921) (codified in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.). 
, .. Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association of Oklahoma, 426 U.S. 776, 
788 (1976) (clear and unavoidable conflict between Disclosure Act and preparation of impact 
statement relieved party from legal obligation to prepare EIS). 
, .. 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(c) (1979). 
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to be supplemented as changed circumstances so dictated. lee 
If applying EIS requirements to annual budget requests were to 
be too cumbersome and impractical, the requirements could apply 
beneficially to other more limited situations within the appropria-
tion process. When an agency initiates or terminates a program 
having significant environmental effects, for instance, the agency 
could prepare an EIS to accompany its relevant budget request. It 
is to be noted, however, that there would be practial difficulties in 
preparing an EIS to accompany any budget request which fails to 
continue a program. Although an EIS should have accompanied 
the underlying programmatic decision to initiate or terminate the 
program,SOO that programmatic statement, even if it had existed, 
would not necessarily have addressed the specific considerations 
involved in a budgetary analysis of environmental factors.SOl The 
agency's initial budget EIS could then be updated in the future if 
the agency significantly changed the scope of the existing 
program. sos 
Another viable possibility for an EIS within the appropriation 
process is a combined programmatic-budget EIS, such as that 
which FWS prepared for NWRsso8 in which FWS's programmatic 
review of the System included a section discussing general alterna-
tive funding levels over a ten year period. so. The major shortcom-
ing of such a programmatic-budget EIS is that, by its nature, it 
deals in generalitiessoa and consequently does not address the types 
of issues peculiar to the annual budget cycle, such as timing and 
expenditures of funds during the fiscal year. The programmatic-
budget EIS could, however, be useful as a budget EIS if it were 
supplemented annuallr" to address those issues relevant to the 
budget cycle. 
'" [d. § 1502.9(c)(I) . 
... Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 359 n.22 (1979) . 
• 0' The district court rejected FWS's proposed programmatic statement as an insufficient 
substitute for a budget EIS. The court noted that the programmatic statement is directed at 
long range goals, while the budget EIS is directed at goals being considered in developing 
specific appropriations proposals. Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187, 1191 (D.D.C. 
1975) . 
• 0. This was the approach taken by the court of appeals. See Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 
F.2d 895, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1978) . 
• 0. See FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, supra note 108. 
... See Table 26 at p. 228. 
... See note 22 supra . 
... See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.9(c)(l)(i), (ii) (1979). 
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B. The Authorization Process 
Absent amendatory legislation to incorporate the appropriation 
process within NEPA's scope, the only effective method through 
which to incorporate impact statements into the budget process is 
the authorization procedure in Congress.207 Authorization legisla-
tion accomplishes two congressional purposes.20B It sets up or con-
tinues the legal operation of programs and agencies, and it estab-
lishes maximum funding levels for these substantive operations 
during their authorized period.2oe As mentioned previously,210 au-
thorizations fall into three categories depending upon their dura-
tion: permanent;111 multi-year;211 and annual.218 Over one-half the 
budget is permanently authorized. These permanent activities are 
regularly considered only by congressional appropriations commit-
tees, since Congress has set up these programs and authorized 
them to continue until further notice with whatever sums are nec-
essary.214 Multi-year programs constitute approximately 10 percent 
of the federal budget in a given year, although in total they consti-
tute approximately one-quarter of the budget, and must be re-
newed when their two- to five-year authorizations run out.2111 
Annual authorizations, which require an agency or program to go 
through both the legislative and appropriations committees yearly, 
constitute less than 15 percent of the budget.218 Indeed, the fact 
that over one-half of the budget is reviewed solely by appropria-
tions committees without any legislative committee review further 
emphasizes the importance of the appropriations process in terms 
of any application of NEPA to budget policy. As has been noted, 
however, the Supreme Court has held that NEPA does not apply 
to the appropriations process.217 
By congressional definition, authorizations are basic substantive 
107 See text at notes 95-99 supra. 
... See note 96 supra. 
"" Id. 
II. See text at notes 96-99 supra. 
III CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL or EXPENDITURES, supra note 92, at 19. 
III Id. at 20-21. 
III Id. at 22-23. 
II. Id. at 19. 
III Id. at 20. 
"" Id. at 22. These percentages are very general and vary from year to year. They do not 
represent specific portions of the whole for any particular year. 
I .. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 349 (1979). 
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legislation,1l8 and CEQ defines legislation to include agency-devel-
oped bills and legislative proposals sent to Congress.lle Authorizing 
legislation is included, therefore, in NEPA's environmental review 
requirement for legislative proposals significantly affecting the en-
vironment.110 Thus, when an agency drafts a proposal for authoriz-
ing legislation in which it seeks to extend or continue a program 
having significant environmental effects, either at the same or at a 
different level of funding, this proposal arguably constitutes a pro-
posal for legislation for the purposes of NEPA and must be accom-
panied by an EIS. An example of how this suggestion would work 
may be illustrated by the proposal of the Appalachian Regional 
Commission ("ARC") to complete the Appalachian Development 
Highway System ("ADHS") by extending the Commission's au-
thorization and increasing its authorized funding levels to accom-
modate an enlarged highway plan at a resulting higher cost.11l 
The Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965111 author-
ized federal agencies to develop programs directed at stimulating 
economic growth in Appalachia.228 Pursuant to the Act, ARC de-
veloped a program for construction of a highway system designed 
to improve access to the area.224 Initially 397.9 miles of highway 
were planned, but as of September, 1979, construction had been 
completed or was being completed on 1700 miles of highway.IJa Al-
though a substantial amount of the construction took place prior 
to the passage of NEPA in 1970, environmental impact statements 
for specific segments of highway had been prepared for approxi-
mately 80 percent of the system.IIS A programmatic EIS analyzing 
the environmental effects of the system as a whole, however, had 
not been prepared. In order to complete the highway project, ARC 
proposed that authorization for ADHS funding, which would run 
out in 1981, be extended to 1986 and that the authorized funding 
I.. See note 96 supra. 
",. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.17 (1979) . 
... See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). See note 12 supra. 
II, See National Wildlife Federation v. Appalachian Regional Commi88ion, No. 78-1913 
(D.D.C., Sept. 14, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-2349 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
III 40 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-405 (1976) . 
... National Wildlife Federation v. Appalachian Regional Commi88ion, No. 78-1913, op. at 
1 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-2349 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
I .. See 40 U.S.C. app. § 201 (1976) . 
... National Wildlife Federation v. Appalachian Regional Commission, No. 78-1913, slip. 
op. at 2 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-~349 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
lie [d. 
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levels be substantially increased to accommodate the project's in-
creased size and expense.117 No EIS accompanied this proposal for 
legislation to Congress. The National Wildlife Federation accord-
ingly brought suit in a federal district court seeking a declaratory 
judgment that ARC violated NEPA by failing to submit an EIS to 
Congress along with its legislative proposal to extend the Commis-
sion's authorization and increase its funding levePl8 The district 
court, however, never reached the issue of NEPA's applicability to 
the authorizing legislation involved for the reason that it found 
that there was an unavoidable conflict between NEPA and the Ap-
palachian Regional Development Act which relieved ARC of its ob-
ligation to prepare an EIS in connection with the highway 
system.IIB 
The ARC case presents a situation in which a legislative EIS 
could well serve the purposes of NEPA. Such an EIS would allow 
Congress to engage in informed decision making in its considera-
tion of whether or not to permit ARC to complete the proposed 
highway system through Appalachia in view of environmental fac-
tors as well as increased costs. The declaratory relief sought would 
provide the court with an opportunity to state definitively whether 
NEPA had been violated and would, moreover, serve the purpose 
of alerting other agencies to their duty to provide an EIS with 
future authorizing legislation for programs significantly affecting 
the environment. lao 
Legislative environmental impact statementsla! accompanying 
authorizing legislation for programs significantly affecting the envi-
ronment offer a practical method of incorporating NEPA's action-
forcing provisions into the budget process. Congress itself has de-
clared, by enacting NEPA, that it seeks to consider environmental 
factors in acting upon legislative proposals; and an authorization 
EIS would allow this kind of informed congressional decision mak-
ing with respect to the extension and refinancing of a federal pro-
gram. An authorization EIS would also be less of an administrative 
burden for the agencies, OMB and Congress than an appropriation 
EIS. Programs due for reauthorization each year constitute less 
.... See S. 835, 125 CONG.RBc. 83695-700 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1979) . 
... National Wildlife Federation v. Appalachian Regional Commiseion, No. 78-1913, 8lip. 
op. at 3-4 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-2349 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
- [d. at 8. 
- But see note 145 supra . 
... See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.8 (1979). 
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than 15 percent of the budgefi32 and would not, therefore, over-
burden the agencies and congressional subcommittees involved, es-
pecially in light of the revised CEQ regulations for a legislative 
EIS.188 
There are, of course, some difficulties with using authorization 
proposals as a NEP A implementation tool, but they are not insur-
mountable. Legislative proposals must be pending in Congress 
before any judicial action can be brought since, by definition, there 
is no "proposal" for legislation for purposes of NEPA until the leg-
islation is transmitted to Congress to be considered.lu A greater 
difficulty, once a proposal is before Congress, is the reluctance of 
courts under various concepts of "justiciability" to interfere in the 
legislative process at any point prior to final congressional ac-
tion.1811 The courts should recognize, however, that NEPA's prime 
purpose is to guarantee informed governmental decision making 
through consideration of the environmental effects of proposed leg-
islation. In the case of authorization legislation, a legal action 
should accordingly be fully ripe for decision at this ongoing stage 
of the legislative process rather than after final legislative action 
has been taken. Congress was surely aware of this situation when it 
included proposals for legislation within NEPA's action-forcing 
provision.18s It may be concluded that it was the intention of Con-
gress, in light of this knowledge, to provide some sort of judicial 
relief at this stage which would not be considered an undue inter-
ference in the legislative process. Declaratory relief would be such 
a remedy. It would clarify the EIS issue and place agencies on no-
tice of their NEP A obligations, while at the same time avoiding 
unnecessary judicial interference in the legislative process. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Andrus v. Sierra Club,187 the Supreme Court banned applica-
tion of the National Environmental Policy Act to the appropria-
"" See CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL or ExPENDITURES, supra note 92, at 20-23. 
"" See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.8 (1979); see text at notes 190-92 supra. 
"" An EIS need not be prepared unless an agency's planning ripens into a recommenda-
tion or report on proposals for legislation or other major federal actions significantly affect-
ing the quality of the human environment. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390,404-06 
(1976); Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 320 (1975). 
I .. See Note, NEPA's Forgotten Clause: Impact Statements for Legislative Proposals, 8 
B.U. L. REv. 560, 582 (1978). 
"" 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). See note 12 supra . 
... 442 U.S. 347 (1979). 
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tion phase of the federal budget process while at the same time 
assuming the existence of an EIS requirement for programmatic 
changes within an agency which occur prior to or apart from that 
process. This article suggests, however, that the most significant 
governmental decision making affecting the environment is agency, 
Office of Management and Budget, and congressional action on the 
federal budget. NEPA's environmental review requirements should 
be extended at an early stage into this budget process and thereby 
into federal resource allocation decisions made at the highest levels 
so as to effectuate <:learly the purpose and spirit of the Act. 
Congress should recognize through amendatory legislation that 
the appropriation process is the most effective vehicle for routine 
environmental review in budgetary decisions since it would involve 
the agencies, OMB, and Congress in a yearly evaluation of the en-
vironmental effects of those decisions. Environmental impact 
statements in the appropriation process would reduce OMB's flex-
ibility by revealing the hidden environmental costs of OMB's 
budgetary decisions, but NEPA was enacted to reveal just such in-
formation and to encourage, as a result, decision making which is 
more responsive to environmental concerns. 
If appropriation environmental impact statements are too cum-
bersome or impractical in view of the time constraints of the 
budget cycle, then authorization requests are a viable alternative 
for extending NEPA's scrutiny to budgetary questions. Authoriza-
tions are substantive legislative proposals which come within the 
Act by virtue of their legislative nature. An environmental impact 
statement requirement extended to proposed authorizations for 
programs significantly affecting the environment would be less of 
an administrative burden within the budget cycle due to the rela-
tively small number of programs which require reauthorization 
each fiscal year. Further, authorization impact statements would 
permit Congress to engage in environmentally informed decision 
making early in the evolution of a program before irreversible 
financial and planning commitments have been made. To further 
these ends, Congress should refuse to consider proposed authoriz-
ing legislation on programs significantly affecting the environment 
unless and until those proposals are accompanied by legislative im-
pact statements. In the absence of such congressional action to en-
force NEPA's mandate, the courts should be ready to do so 
through the issuance of declaratory judgments that the Act has 
been violated. This would serve both to enforce the Act and to put 
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agencies on notice of their continuing obligation to comply with its 
provisions. 
